Download Differential Information Economies by Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis PDF
By Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
One of many major difficulties in present financial conception is to write down contracts that are Pareto optimum, incentive appropriate, and likewise implementable as an ideal Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative video game. The query arises if it is attainable to supply Walrasian kind or cooperative equilibrium ideas that have those homes. This quantity comprises unique contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential details and gives solutions to the above questions. furthermore, matters of stability, studying and continuity of other equilibria also are tested.
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Extra info for Differential Information Economies
17 This section uses results and statements from Glycopantis et al. (2003b). 42 D. C. 1. An allocation x = (x1 , . . , xn ) ∈ L allocation if (i) each xi (·) is FI -measurable;18 n n (ii) i=1 xi (ω) = i=1 ei (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω; (iii) there do not exist state of nature ω ∗ ∈ Ω, coalition S and allocation ¯ X such that yi (·) − ei (·) is FS -measurable for all i ∈ S, (yi )i∈S ∈ i∈S L i ∗ ∗ i∈S ei (ω), for all ω and vi (yi |FS )(ω ) > vi (xi |Fxi )(ω ) i∈S yi (ω) = for all i ∈ S, where Fxi denotes the information connected with xi .
A comparison between the DIE model and the Harsanyi type models can be found in Hahn and Yannelis (1997). In particular this paper contains a comparison of some of the Holmstr¨om and Myerson (1983) incentive compatibility notions and the ones in the DIE literature. Finally it is important to notice that in a multilateral contracts model, it appears more appropriate to ensure CBIC rather than IBIC. Obviously CBIC implies IBIC but the reverse is not true, as an example in the preface of this volume demonstrates.
1 2 1 1 2 2 It follows that a Radner equilibrium with non-negative prices exists if the following system of equations has a non-negative solution. 2 ((p11 + p21 )(p12 + 1 p22 )) 2 = 1 1 (p31 p32 ) 2 , 18 D. C. Yannelis M1 + M2 = 7(p11 + p21 ) + (p12 + p22 ) + 4p31 + p32 1 2 1 = 1 1 1 2 3 (p1 p2 ) 2 ((p1 + p1 )(p22 + p32 )) 2 m1 + m2 = p11 + 10p12 + (p21 + p31 ) + 7(p22 + p32 ) M1 m1 m1 M1 + + = 8, = 11 2(p11 + p21 ) 2p11 2(p12 + p22 ) 2p12 M2 m2 m2 M2 + + = 5, =8 2p31 2(p21 + p31 ) 2p32 2(p22 + p32 ) m2 M1 m2 M1 + + = 8, = 8.